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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
OPEN COURT
PLAN FOR SURVEY OF LYNCHING AND TH E JUDICIAL PROCESS
Three lynchings in the first three months of 1931, negroes in Mis-
souri and Mississippi and a white man in North Dakota, bear solemn
witness to the fact that mobbism in America remains a perennial prob-
lem. Figures for the two preceding years make manifestations of
lynch law so early in the new year doubly foreboding. A record of
ten lynchings in 1929 was in 1930 increased to twenty-five. One of
these was North Carolina's first in nine years. The situation chal-
lenges thoughtful consideration.
Cannot the judicial process be shaped into an effective deterrent?
The University of North Carolina School of Law, in conjunction
with the Commission on Interracial Coperation, has undertaken an
elaborate project to facilitate this result. The problems confronting
the law as a result of the prevalence of lynching are to be compre-
hensively studied. The investigation will continue for a year and a
half, and at the end of this time a written report suitable for publica-
tion will be prepared. It is contemplated that definite suggestions for
specific legislation can be included. Necessary funds have been made
available by the Interracial Commission, and the work will engage the
full time of one salaried research worker. Among the members of
the Commission who are actively interested are Dr. W. C. Jackson,
President; Dr. W. W. Alexander, Executive Director, and Mr. G. F.
Milton, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Lynching. An advisory
committee of deans drawn from the leading southern law schools will
assist in the work.
As an approach to the prospective study just outlined, the January
meeting of the class in the Administration of Justice, supervised by
Professor R. H. Wettach, was devoted to a consideration of the legal
problems incident to lynching. Dr. Jackson and visitors from the
Department of Sociology were present. Six papers were prepared
and delivered:
1. Effect upon Mob Action of a Change of Venue or a Postpone-
ment of Trial, by W. A. Johnson.
2. Summary Trial in Serious Cases-Effect of Undue Haste,
Mob Intimidation, and Use of Militia upon Due Process of
Law, by E. M. Perkins.
3. Prosecution of Lynahers, by A. W. Langston.
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4. Liability of City or County under State Legislation, by L. J.
Giles.
5. Removal of Sheriff for Failure to do Duty, by J. N. Wright.
6. Constitutionality of Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill, by R. M. Gray.
These studies are too lengthy for publication in full. However, the
timeliness and importance of the material thus far collected indicate
the desirability of an abridgement. The present writer makes haste
to disavow any credit or responsibility for the collection of this
material. An attempt will be made in reporting them to emphasize
the points which were most provocative of discussion at the reading
of the papers.
Prevalence of the Evil
The valuable study by Walter White, Rope and Faggot (Knopf,
New York, 1929), sets out full and authentic figures indicating the
prevalence of lynching. In the forty-five years following 1882, 4799
persons have been lynched. Three-fourths of the victims are charge-
able against the record of the south. Georgia and Mississippi lead
with over 300 apiece. North Carolina ranks thirteenth with a record
of 101. Of the 4799 figure, 96 were women and the majority negroes.
Murder is the cause assigned for 35 per cent, assaults on white women
for 25 per cent, and miscellaneous causes for 40 per cent. Of all the
states the honor of only four is unsullied by the disgrace of mob
murder-Vermont, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Massachu-
setts.
Change of Venue and Postponements: Stimulants for Mob Action
The psychology of mob action is complex, but experience in at
least two instances demonstrates what common sense would foretell.
A change of venue often incites a mob to immediate action. A
recent Georgia case is a good example. Defendant was charged with
assault on a white woman. The first trial was so dominated by mob
intimidation that the appellate court ordered a new trial in an ad-
joining county. Defendant, a young white man, was lynched before
he reached the next county for trial. A similar effect is often pro-
duced by delays in a trial. To such a cause Delaware's one lynching
is probably attributable. The Governor was petitioned to set a spe-
cial date for trial in advance of the regular term, then four months
away. A burning at the stake was the mob's answer to his refusal.
Likewise taking exceptions for an appeal recently proved the final
signal for nmob action in Georgia.
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Summary Trial as an Alternative
An escape from exciting mobs to final action by changes of
venue and postponements is presented by the summary trial with
immediate execution of its sentence. It is believed, however, that
such trials in effect result in legal lynching. This conclusion is forti-
fied by an examination of specific summary trials. Moore v. Demp-
sey (261 U. S. 86) is a striking illustration.
In 1919 in Arkansas a number of negroes assembled in their
church and were attacked and fired upon by a body of white men.
One of the latter was killed in the affray. The report of this. killing
caused great excitement and was followed by the hunting down and
killing of many negroes. There was one further white casualty,
and for this certain negroes were arrested. The governor appointed
a committee to investigate the lawlessness. It sought to avoid immi-
nent mob action by promise of an immediate trial for the defendants.
The grand jury which returned the indictment contained many of
the men who had formed the posse to fight the negroes. Counsel
appointed by the court to defend them did not demand a change of
venue, challenge a juror, or have a preliminary conference with the
accused. No witnesses were called for the defense, and in three-
quarters of an hour a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree
was returned. According to affidavits no juror could have voted for
acquittal and continued to live in the county.
This case and others which could be cited show that summary
trial is so open to abuse and unfairness to the accused that it is little
better than the lynch law that it seeks to supplant. Indeed, perhaps
even this gesture of due process in trying the accused may not as-
suage the passions of the mob. In a Texas case, although a summary
trial was had and immediate execution of the sentence was contem-
plated, the assembled mob burned the convicted negro forthwith on
the pronouncement of sentence.
Manifestations of Mobbism at Trial: Effect on Due Process
A further difficulty of summary trials is the possibility that the
proceedings will be set aside as wanting in due process. Appellate
courts are not agreed as to when mob intimidation causes this result.
The problem may be presented by a composite picture of such
intimidation.
There will be excited cries from members of the mob-"Hang
him"; an excited relative of the deceased will attack the accused be-
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fore the jury. Demonstrations are planned to destroy the effect of
defense counsel's argument. While the jury is considering the case
men outside in the court house yard swear and use threatening lan-
guage to the jury, "If the jury does not hang him we will," and
again, "We will give the jury until ten o'clock to convict him, and
if they don't we will take him out and hang him." The court naively
admonishes the jury that they are not to consider such demonstra-
tions, and in the same spirit jurors make affidavits that their verdict
was not influenced.
It is doubtful whether the results of the cases can be formulated
into any generalizations of practical worth. A great deal depends
on the philosophy of individual judges. The reader is referred to
the United States cases of Frank v. Mangum (237 U. S. 309) and
Moore v. Dempsey (261 U. S. 86) and the North Carolina case of
State v. Newsome (195 N. C. 552). Although two of the cases re-
fused a new trial, the dissenting opinions show how the course of
such decisions will be shaped by individual ideas of what constitutes
substantial justice for the accused.
Types of Legislation
In general legislation seeks the eradication of lynching in three
ways: 1. By facilitating the prosecution of lynchers. 2. By imposing
liability in damages on the county or city which is the scene of the
lynching. 3. By removing sheriffs for failure to perform their duty
in the premises.
To supplement the common law of crimes which a lynching may
involve, statutes often provide severe and specific penalties for mem-
bers of the guilty mob. North Carolina, West Virginia, Virginia,
Kentucky, and Georgia, among others, have such laws. The pro-
visions of the Georgia statute are effective when any person has been
lynched "without due process of law." The implication would be
laughable, were it not so grim.
A specific study of the North Carolina statute shows that it has
not been without effect in bringing about the prosecution of lynchers.
It recognizes lynching specifically as a crime, provides for change of
venue for cause, and gives concurrent jurisdiction to counties ad-
joining the one alleged to be the scene of the crime. It provides,
however, only for punishment when the accused has been taken from
a jail, and conspiracy or intent to kill or injure must be shown.
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In 1919 fifteen members of a mob which stormed the Forsyth
County jail for the purpose of lynching a negro were sent to prison
for terms varying from six to fifteen years. Again, in September
1925 the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the conviction and
sentence to thirty years' imprisonment of the leader of the mob
which mutilated Joseph Needleman in Martin County. In the same
week the authorities of Buncombe County arrested twenty members
of the mob which stormed the jail in Asheville seeking to lynch a
young negro boy. Special terms were called by the Governor to try
the would-be lynchers and their intended victims. Twenty were
punished.
North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia im-
pose pecuniary liability on the county which is the scene of a lynch-
ing. The penalty is recoverable in a civil action by the lynched
party, regardless of his guilt, or, in case of death, by his personal
representative. Illinois and Kansas impose a similar liability on
cities. In North Carolina and West Virginia the statute has the
undesirable provision that it is applicable only when the person
lynched was in the custody of the law. These statutes generally
have been successfully invoked to compensate aggrieved parties.
There is no evidence, however, that the North Carolina statute has
been so used. It may be noted that this legislation represents an
honest attempt to make amends to those who suffer from the lawless-
ness of mobbism. But is the broader purpose of retarding lynching
accomplished? Is it fanciful to make the twofold assumption that
would-be lynchers know of such laws and that, knowing them, they
are thereby appreciably halted in their purposes?
It is not to be doubted that in many cases custodians of prisoners
are responsible for mob crimes. By remaining alert to the spirit of
the community and by intelligent removal of their charges before a
crisis actually occurs they can often checkmate the mob. The third
type of legislation seeks to create such a responsibility. Alabama,
Illinois, Kentucky, Kansas, Minnesota, and Indiana have statutes
providing generally for removal of the sheriff where a prisoner in
his custody is lynched. The Alabama statute provides for impeach-
ment in such a contingency. Illinois makes such an occurrence prima
fade evidence of negligent performance of duty and provides for
discretionary removal by the governor. The latter feature seems
better handled by the Indiana statute, which provides for complil-
sory removal by the court. There are recorded examples of the suc-
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cessful use of these statutes to remove delinqunt sheriffs. The de-
sirability of such legislation is further illustrated by a comparatively
recent failure in Georgia to remove a sheriff, in the absence of a
specific statute of this nature. At the present writing a bill intro-
duced in the North Carolina Senate, providing for compulsory im-
prisonment of those charged with capital crimes in the state peni-
tentiary or jail of adjoining county, has received an unfavorable
report by a House committee.
No record has been found of the successful use, for the purpose
of removing sheriffs in the particular instance of a lynching, of stat-
utes providing in general for the removal of delinquent county
officers.
The Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill
Attempts to curb lynchings by means of federal action began in
1902. As an aftermath of large indemnities paid to foreign govern-
ments because mobs in several states had lynched citizens of these
countries, a bill was suggested to protect aliens. No action was taken
on it.
In 1920 Congressman Dyer of Missouri first introduced a fed-
eral anti-lynching bill designed to protect citizens as well as aliens.
In 1922 the bill passed the House, but was defeated in the Senate
by a filibuster of southern senators. It provides in brief for juris-
diction of the federal courts to punish county officers and lynchers,
and for the forfeiture to the United States of $10,000 by any county
which is the scene of a lynching.
One of the strongest arguments urged against the bill was its
alleged unconstitutionality. Under the orthodox interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is probably subject to this attack.
The amendment, it is said, operates only to prohibit certain state
laws or certain actions by the state through its various agencies.
"Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of
the amendment." Would federal legislation in this field be constitu-
tional? Its probable efficacy makes this a question of no small
importance.
Conclwsion
The damning figures of previous years and the early outcropping
of lynch law for this year show that as yet the solution has not been
found. More lynchers may be punished, more counties fined, and
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more sheriffs removed; but no legislation will have solved the prob-
lem until lynching is virtually eradicated. Then only will the neces-
sity for investigation and experimentation end.
JAMES H. CHADBOURN.
"COMMERCIALISM" IN THE BAR*
It has become a commonplace that the great danger to the bar
today is commercialism. What is commercialism in the bar? It is
not the organization of large law firms, not the adoption of efficient
office methods, not the earning of large incomes. A man may earn
$100,000 a year at the bar and keep his professional soul; he may eke
out a pittance, and sacrifice his soul on the altar of Mammon. Com-
mercialism, as was said of Boston, is a state of mind.
As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he; and where a man's treas-
ure is, the thing that he values and that makes life worth living to
him, there will his heart be also. So long as a man loves the history
of the law and the stories of the great lawyers whose deeds and words
form the traditions of the bar, so long as new legal problems arouse
interest and a desire to solve them, so long as an honorable victory in
the courts brings joy apart from the fruits of it, so long as legal aid
given a deserving client brings a satisfaction not measured by the fee,
just so long is that man a lawyer and a member of a great and honor-
able profession. But the moment that he loses interest in the law as
a science, that his work 'becomes merely a means to money, that he
looks upon his client only as a customer to be sold something to the
financial advantage of the seller, at that moment does he cease to be
a professional man and become a mere huckster at law.
In our times, when the standards of commercial life are being
raised, and many kinds of business are approaching the ethical plane
of the learned professions, the ancient profession of the law is called
upon to face and fight the threatened loss of the very characteristics
that have made it great and honorable. It will be death to the legal
profession to lose its professional standards. If these fall, with the
inevitably consequent loss of public respect and self respect, whence
will come the wise leadership in affairs of state, the learned, impartial
and incorruptible judiciary, and the assurance to every man, rich or
poor, of equal justice before the law, that only a high minded and
able bar can furnish?
*Extract from an address by Hon. Henry T. Lummus before the Middle-
sex Bar Association, January 23, 1929. Reprinted in 16 MASSACHusE-rs LAW
QuARTERLY at p. 22.
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It is with such thoughts in mind that the matter of requirements
for admission to the bar must be approached. Obviously this matter
is more important than ever before. Doubtless in the old days many
imperfectly trained men were admitted to the bar. We hear the story
of the explanation given by an old-time bar examiner for the admis-
sion of one youth. "We asked him," said the examiner, "what the
rule in Shelley's Case is. He answered that the rule is that if a poet
becomes an Atheist the court will take the custody of his children
away from him. That was wrong. Then we asked him what the rule
against perpetuities is, and he answered that he didn't know. That
answer was right; he didn't know. So we gave him a mark of fifty,
and admitted him." It is very likely that the average applicant in
those days was not as well prepared as now. But once admitted, how
much greater than ours was his opportunity to become steeped in the
best traditions of the profession! The bar was small, men were less
hurried, the trial of cases occupied a larger part of a lawyer's atten-
tion, and the lawyers often went on circuit after the English fashion.
Think what it must have meant to be a fledgeling at the bar to hear
James Sullivan and Lemuel Shaw, it might be, argue against Nathan
Dane and Joseph Story, before Chief Justice Parsons and his court,
and then listen to the conversation among all of them at the tavern
after dinner! Merely to listen must have been a liberal education.
Think what it meant to Abraham Lincoln, whose scanty education at
the time he was admitted to the bar is always referred to when re-
quirements are discussed, to ride the circuit with Judge David Davis,
to whom in admiration and gratitude Lincoln later gave a seat upon
the Supreme Court of the United States!
Now all is changed. Men are busier, and the leaders of the bar
avoid the court room. There is little fellowship among the new-
comers at the bar and those who could guide their courses aright.
Unless a man, when he is admitted to the bar, has made his own the
soul and spirit of the profession, he is in danger, for he will find little
opportunity to absorb it later.
It is therefore more important than ever before to see to it that
those who are admitted to the bar are worthy in character as well as
in acquirements. Unfortunately the character of a young man in his
early twenties is usually unformed, or at least untested. But so far
as possible it should be investigated, and notwithstanding all dis-
couragements the character committees established by the Board of
Bar Examiners should continue to function.
